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Abstract 
We develop a three-way categorization of capacity and its utilization covering micro, 
meso and macro framings, beginning with the approaches of Marshall, Steindl and 
Penrose. Within firms, we combine Steindl’s analysis on fixed capital with Penrose’s 
consideration of resources, including a higher-order form of capacity.  We examine the 
implications of capacity expansion for competition and for the maturity of the industry, 
which reflects back on the value of the firm.  We then argue that our higher-order concept 
of capacity can be made operational for empirical study by identifying a critical 
bottleneck that restrains firm growth at each point in its development. 
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1.  Introduction 
Capitalism is dynamic. There is in-built provision for accumulation and growth through 
channelling an income stream to those with ownership interests in the production process. 
Yet, economic theory generally treats the capitalist firm as a static participant in the 
economic process, with no explicit role for its growth or development over time. An 
exception is Edith Penrose’s (1995) The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. 
 Penrose’s analysis is micro in orientation. There is no consideration of the impact 
of firm on the larger economy. The missing element in Penrose’s analysis is the industry, 
which provides a meso level of analysis linking micro analysis with the macroeconomy. 
Marshall (1920) quite properly identifies the industry as the appropriate level of 
aggregation for analyzing the role of competition under capitalism. Competition is 
essential to understanding the evolution of capitalism, as it provides the mechanism 
whereby selection operates to distinguish the dynamics of macroeconomy from the 
dynamics of the micro units of which it is comprised. With competition and the selection 
process it generates, behaviour of the whole is not simply the sum of the parts. 
An analysis of firm growth that links firm growth to the macroeconomy and 
provides for consideration of the role of competition is Steindl’s (1976) Maturity and 
Stagnation in American Capitalism. Here, firms reinvest retained earnings to expand their 
capacity to produce current products, but an obstacle exists to unlimited expansion, 
namely the existence of other firms supplying similar products – the industry. Leading 
firms are able to overcome this obstacle temporarily through aggressive competition, 
which slows capacity growth through the reduction profits for reinvestment and the 
elimination of fringe producers. The latter impact is a type of Schumpeterian “creative 
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destruction”, with the creation of capacity by leading firms destroying the capacity of 
fringe firms (Bloch, 2000). Eventually though, the industry matures with the elimination 
of fringe producers leaving a concentrated core of producers. This concentrated core 
demurs from further reinvestment because they realize the adverse consequences for their 
profitability. Hence, maturity is associated with stagnation. 
 Penrosian firms change as they grow. Managerial resources are the key constraint 
on growth of enterprising firms in Penrose’s analysis, but managers learn from their 
experience, adding to their capability for expansion. The expanded managerial capability 
can be used for overseeing the expansion of productive capacity for existing products 
through reinvestment of profits as in Steindl. However, it can also be used for 
overcoming obstacles, like limited demand for a particular product or aggressive 
competition within a particular product market, by seeking out opportunities for growth 
through diversification or new product development. Thus, managerial capability 
represents a higher-order concept of capacity than Steindl’s productive capacity. It also 
represents a mechanism for rejuvenating a mature industry or shifting a firm’s expansion 
to a less mature industry, thereby overcoming the tendency toward stagnation.  
 In this paper we explore the interaction between expansion of capacity at the level 
of the individual firm and competition at the level of the industry. We are particularly 
concerned with the implications for the macroeconomy, especially the prospects for 
avoiding a tendency towards stagnation as capitalism evolves. In the following section, 
we review literature that deals with capacity at the level of the firm and at the level of the 
industry, including the work of Marshall, Steindl and Penrose. Section 3 argues for a 
broadened understanding of capacity, both for the firm and for the industry. In Section 4, 
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we examine the implications of capacity expansion for competition and for the maturity 
of the industry, which reflects back on the value of the firm. Section 5 suggests our 
higher-order concept of capacity can be made operational for empirical study by 
identifying a critical bottleneck that restrains firm growth at each point in its 
development. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Introducing meso-phenomena to the capacity debate 
The manner in which we consider the industry as a distinct unit of analysis makes a 
significant difference to how we conceive of capacity and its utilization for both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic analyses.  Given the question of capacity and its 
utilization, the industry is a meso and emergent unit of analysis, which is irreducible to 
the number of firms (as micro units of analysis) and makes a difference to how we 
capture the effects of decisions made in firms for macroeconomic performance (Dopfer et 
al., 2004).  We set out a dynamic framework of firms interacting with one another in 
industrial settings characterized by imperfect competition, and explain how this can be 
extended for the purposes of evolutionary analyses.   
 The received literature on capacity and utilization tends to focus on 
macroeconomic performance and is a development of the Phillips curve debate on 
inflation and the natural rate (Shepherd and Driver, 2003; Driver and Shepherd, 2005).  
Following Eliasson (1991), it can be described generally as a micro-macro approach, 
distinct from our introduction of an additional meso level of analysis.  Further, following 
Dopfer et al. (2004), we envisage a chain of connections between levels of analysis in 
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which each level has a degree of autonomy, but in which there are “vertical spillovers” 
between levels, the magnitude and direction of which depend on interactions within a 
particular level.   
Received micro analyses associated with macro-capacity and utilization studies 
tend either to be predicated upon surveys among firms as categorized within broad 
productive sectors of economies or based implicitly on theoretical visions of a 
representative or average firm.  We suggest an alternative micro basis, with firms 
considered as active constituents of industries, themselves seen as coherent functioning 
meso units of analysis.  The basis of function and coherence among firms in the industry 
is the norm of imperfect competition.  By changing the focus of capacity and utilization 
analysis to the firms and industries, considered as units of analysis (micro and meso 
levels), we seek to uncover how macro outcomes can be perceived and captured 
differently to the established micro-macro analyses of capacity.   
 Our analysis has a distinctly Marshallian flavour to it, drawing from Marshall’s 
industry analysis (Marshall, 1919, 1920; Loasby, 1978; Raffaelli, 2004).  Marshall’s 
formal analysis of firms and industries develops from his identification of time periods, 
and especially the short and long runs.  The evolutionary aspect of Marshall’s analysis 
derives from there being heterogeneous firms in industries, even though he does not 
pursue the full implications of this.  Analytically, his invocation of the representative firm 
prevents a more thorough evolutionary analysis.  Empirically or historically, Marshall 
develops a discursive three-generational model of firms, believing them to lack sufficient 
longevity and vigour as on-going organizational forms, which again truncates any 
evolutionary analysis by imposing an additional and exogenous form of selection.   
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 Marshall’s time periods provide one dimension to understanding the interaction of 
capacity and utilization, and one that is additional to the established micro-macro 
approach.  In the short run, capacity is fixed and we can isolate utilization.  Many 
macroeconomic studies interpret their data in this way, despite sometimes using 
terminology that conflates the time periods and their implicit assumptions with real time 
(such as using “term” for “run” or discussing “longer or shorter runs”) (Langlois 1992).  
Conceptually, capacity can be varied alongside utilization in the long run, and it may also 
be the case that capacity is extended through utilization in real time, for instance in 
learning-by-doing. 
Steindl (1976) presents a significant development of the Marshallian theme of 
heterogeneous firms within industry systems, in which surplus capacity is a cause and 
consequence of the pattern of competition.
2
  This provides us with interactions in the 
form of imperfect competition among firms in an industry setting as a second micro-meso 
dimension of analysis additional to the more established micro-macro approaches.  The 
question we ask of Steindl’s analysis is whether his explanation of a competitive process 
is self-contained or whether there are spillovers with macro consequences.  In systems 
terms, we assess the extent to which interaction among a defined set of heterogeneous 
firms can be represented as a ‘nearly-decomposable’ process of competition (Simon 
1962). 
A third dimension to our analysis – again additional to the established micro-
macro approach – draws upon Penrose (1995), the subsequent resource-based view of the 
firm, and the contemporary focus on dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000; Dosi et al., 2000; Winter, 2003).  These generally resource-based or 
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behavioural analyses focus on firms to the exclusion of industries, at least in terms of 
industries being considered as coherent and so defined systems rather than unbounded 
environments or components of environments.
 3
  But they provide a two-(or more)-
layered understanding of capacity, categorizing firms’ capabilities as direct and indirect 
(Loasby 1999A), where the capabilities extend beyond fixed capital.  Similarly, Pindyck 
(1988: 970) argues that a firm generates options to invest in further capacity by virtue 
that: ‘managerial resources, reputation, market position, and possibly scale, all of which 
have been built up over time, enable it to productively undertake investments that 
individuals or other firms cannot undertake.’
 4
 
While understanding a proportion or dimension of capacity as capabilities raises 
considerable measurement problems and also problems of aggregation across direct and 
indirect types of capability, especially as the different layers of types may interact, it 
helps in generating novel research questions.  Again, we are interested in the likely 
consequences of such an analysis as these spillover into (given the firm-centric element 
of the resource-based approach) both meso and macro levels.   
 
 
3. Defining capacity and its utilization within firms and within industries 
In principle, the definition of utilization is non-controversial.  Capacity is established or 
captured at a point in time, or for a period of time, for a given usage including shift 
patterns (Steindl, 1976, pp. 24-5).  There is also a level of slack built-in as a precaution 
against fluctuations and inaccuracies in predicting demand, and to cover the behavioural, 
administrative and political consequences of planning and operating within a firm 
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considered as on on-going social organization (Andrews, 1949, 1964; Cyert and March, 
1992).  In historical analysis, it may be difficult to disentangle the effects of capacity 
change and utilization change, especially where utilization carries with it capacity 
expansion through unexpected or unpredictable learning by doing (Langlois 1991).  This 
implies that there may be an autonomous component to utilization, or at least one beyond 
managerial deliberation.  But when adopting the Marshallian convention of short and 
long runs, utilization is part of the short-run analytical framework, while changing 
capacity can be understood within the long-run analytical framework.   
 Even in principle, capacity is harder to define than utilization.  We can begin with 
thinking of capacity as a set of connected and at least partially irreversible commitments 
brought together in order to realize a business plan or an (especially Schumpeterian) 
entrepreneurial vision.  Means of connection can include designed and planned 
organizational and production systems (Lieberman, 1989; Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Brusoni et al., 2001; Buensdorf, 2005) and also market-mediated or more durable 
relationships between companies (Richardson, 1972; Dubois 1998).  Critical to 
commitment is irreversibility and so a loss of options values (Pindyck 1988).  Research 
into capacity, whether of a macro or micro nature, has tended to focus on fixed capital, 
which as an expression of irreversible commitment is unified as units and separable from 
other units.  Capacity becomes identified with fixed capital, with empirical analysis often 
concentrating on the manufacturing and extractive sectors of a national economy in 
which firms tend to use fixed capital intensively and also face many replacing, upgrading 
and marginal adjusting decisions (Lieberman, 1989; Driver and Shepherd, 2005).   
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 We present a different framework for understanding capacity that questions the 
assumptions of unity and separability that are often implied where capacity is identified 
closely with fixed capital.  Following Simon (1962), we question the implication that all 
units of capacity (including but not totally identified with fixed capital) are uniformly 
nearly decomposable.  We take our lead from two authors whose work has yet to be well 
integrated into contemporary analyses of capacity and utilization, namely Steindl and 
Penrose.  Steindl’s (1945, 1976) framework centres on the industry, as a meso unit of 
analysis, with capacity commitments being made by heterogeneous firms with differential 
access to ‘outsider’ funds, and as a consequence to fixed capital.  Steindl – along with 
contemporaries including Andrews (1949, 1964) and Downie (1958) – is attempting to 
pursue a Marshallian analysis of firms and industries in the context of imperfect 
competition rather than in the context of Marshall’s “generally competitive” capitalism.   
Steindl’s starting point is that industries, as meso units of analysis, comprise 
heterogeneous firms with well-specified connections to external suppliers of finance and 
fixed capital, and to buyers.  The suppliers and buyers are, in contrast to the firms in the 
focal industry, considered as groups.  As Steindl makes few enquiries as to the 
composition of these groups, implicitly they may as well be homogenous.  Further, the 
boundaries between groups (or other industrial systems) are represented as markets, 
which are upstream (suppliers of fixed capital and outside finance) and downstream 
(buyers) of the focal industry (Podolny et al., 1996; White, 2002).  Strictly, the buyer 
market is imperfect because producer firms in the focal industry can influence demand 
through varying their selling costs, extending to what Steindl (1976, pp. 55-66) terms 
‘quality competition’ with other firms in the industry.  Explicitly, markets for external 
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funds (borrowing) are imperfect, with large firms being able to acquire “external” funds 
and small firms being excluded from these exchanges.
5
  There are significant barriers to 
expansion caused by differential abilities in acquiring outsider finance, and to a further 
extent by indivisibilities in fixed capital: ‘The basic fact with regard to the cost of 
borrowing is that the long term capital market is open to small firms only at prohibitive 
cost’ (Steindl, 1945, p. 19).
 6
   
Firms’ participation in markets for fixed capital is derivative of their participation 
in markets for external funds.  Fixed capital itself is of a commodity or undifferentiated 
nature at any particular time.  Firms will have different capabilities to adapt and apply 
fixed capital, and this may be related to absorptive capacity (which is speculative 
intellectual capacity and may prove to be redundant) (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  Any 
absorptive capacity to apply fixed capital is secondary to the dominant and differential 
abilities of firms to borrow external finance in order to buy fixed capital.   
The key point about capacity that we can carry over from Steindl is that it is 
identified with three types of capital:  fixed capital, uncommitted or liquid insider finance 
in the form of retained earnings, and external uncommitted or liquid finance that only a 
subset of firms in the industry has access to.  Capacity in the industry is then a function of 
firms’ fixed capital, their differential abilities to earn and then retain a proportion of 
earnings for reinvestment internally, their abilities to borrow outsider finance and a factor 
that is external to the individual firm, namely the firms’ imperfectly competitive 
interactions with other firms in the industry (Boone, 2001).   
Each firm’s capacity, the site of irreversible commitments in different types of 
capital by different agents within the industry or connected with the industry, is 
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considered as part of an industry’s capacity.  There are oligopolistic interdependencies 
between firms’ capacities.   For Steindl, as with Schumpeter’s “creative destruction”, one 
firm’s differential capability to install capacity can lead to the destruction of capacity 
elsewhere in the industry if one or more of the heterogeneous firms are producing the 
same product but at higher unit cost.  Less dramatically, one firm’s installation of 
capacity can reduce the value of other firms’ capacities differentially, irrespective of the 
levels of utilization.  We discuss value and capacity below, in Section 4. 
Penrose (1959) provides a different perspective on capacity, and one that has been 
developed further within the contemporary research area of firms’ dynamic capabilities 
(Teece et al., 1997; Foss, 1999; Loasby, 1999B; Dosi et al., 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Winter, 2003).  By adopting a Penrosian perspective, we question the unity of 
capacity by re-assessing Steindl’s clear-cut identification of fixed capital with capacity.  
Firms’ abilities to execute plans or entrepreneurial visions are no longer separated from 
the process of developing plans and visions.  Internally, a firm’s ability to deploy direct 
capabilities as capacity is constrained by their indirect capabilities in making business 
plans and identifying resources that can be connected together.  Any success in enacting 
plans can lead to a freeing of resources over time, forming a feedback effect.  
Formulating and implementing plans of productive activities and entrepreneurial visions 
is integral to firms’ capacities and is installed permanently within the firm, especially in 
the form or role of a top management team.  A further implication is that many 
employees also make significant and irreversible commitments to the implementation to 
firms’ plans and entrepreneurial visions (Blair and Stout, 1999). 
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The boundary conditions of Steindl’s industry system are the means of connection 
with other industries (including immediate buyers).  The boundary conditions of 
Penrose’s system are in the firm’s ability to generate and re-generate resources – in part 
through learning by doing and through managerial experience – and in capturing these 
resources as direct productive services.  “Productive services” is capacity currently 
connected with an implemented plan or entrepreneurial vision.  Following Penrose, 
resources themselves (despite lending themselves to the “resource-based view”) are 
unconnected or awaiting capture and connection by way of plans, visions, and means of 
implementing these, so that upon connection they may be classified as yielding 
productive services.  By analogy, for Steindl, firms’ abilities to acquire and then retain 
funds internally for re-investment and to borrow external funds are means to capacity, or 
are an indirect capacity to create direct productive capacity.   
Following Penrose, we can expand this “middle type” of firm-specific, but 
indirect, capacity to include the repeatable activities of reviewing and ranking established 
and proximate market opportunities, harnessing resources internally, and implementing 
and/or monitoring routines and standard operating procedures.
 7
  The presence of the 
senior management team in particular can be interpreted as fixed but indirect capacity 
because of the difficulties in hiring new managers and introducing them into an 
established management group.  This much is concealed in Steindl’s analysis through his 
restrictions on firm heterogeneity, and so his fairly standardized view of firms seeking to 




4.  Changes in capacity and in value 
So far we have argued for the extension of a default understanding of capacity.  We seek 
to assess the implications for autonomous and deliberative changes in utilization to 
include both direct capabilities in undertaking activities and indirect capabilities or 
dynamic capabilities.  The latter involve firms envisaging, planning and implementing 
adjustments to capacity by drawing upon repeatable procedures.
 8
  We mention default, as 
bounds are required on this rather complex vision of capacity in dynamic settings.  
Implicitly, different kinds of bounds are available to researchers, depending first upon 
whether they adopt an industry-centric or rather a firm-centric view of the acquisition, 
adjustment and utilization of capacity.   
Steindl displaces the higher-order capacity to structural conditions of acquiring 
outsider finance in combination with retained and pre-committed insider finance in order 
to make commitments to a production plan by investing in fixed capital.  While only the 
subset of “progressive” firms in an industry seeks to acquire external funds and new 
capital goods, the interfaces with finance and capital goods markets from the perspective 
of firms within the “progressive” subset are generally competitive.  Furthermore, the 
capital goods implicitly have the characteristics of commodities, in the sense that their 
characteristics are described adequately by a contract of exchange, supported by market 
institutions of exchange.  As components of overall plans and as realized in production or 
activity processes, the capital goods are by implication risk free in that their exchange is 
assumed to be captured and described fully through a spot contract.  Firms in the focal 
industry do not need to have installed and maintain on-going absorptive capacity – a 
higher-order or dynamic capability (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) – in order to source, 
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purchase and use capital goods.
 9
  As Steindl identifies firms with an industry and with 
capacity, and capacity with fixed capital, he excludes from his explanation the role for a 
proportion of employees as similarly permanent of on-going members of a firm 
responsible for the development, maintenance and practice of indirect or dynamic 
capabilities in an on-going social organization.   
Penrose, along with subsequent contributors to the resource-based view and to the 
dynamic capabilities approach, presents accounts of connections with other firms, 
industries, markets and organizations in fuzzy terms (Penrose, 1995, pp. 107-8).  
Objectively, and in common with Steindl’s industry-centric analysis of firms’ productive 
capacities, a focal firm may acquire fixed capital in supply markets non-problematically.  
Implicitly, fixed capital again has well-established characteristics that allow productive 
services to be acquired from fixed capital, considered as resources.  Purchases are 
described by contracts, and their exchanges and guarantees are further secured by the 
conventions of established upstream markets.  There are no improvised and on-going 
interactions between firms, implying that all firms have distinctive boundaries essentially 
that demarcate their activities from those of actual and potential supplying, rivaling, 
collaborating and purchasing firms and organizations.   
Subjectively, resources that yield productive services, and are available from 
other firms and organizations through market-mediated exchanges, are subject to the 
capabilities of a firm’s employees – especially its senior managers – of connecting these 
with an entrepreneurial vision and plan (ibid., p. 77).  This encompasses a perceived 
market opportunity, resources available currently with the firm, and resources that can be 
acquired.  A resource, often fixed capital with well-defined productive services, becomes 
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combined with a subjective vision or chain of activities stretching across a focal firm and 
its connections within suppliers and buyers (Podolny et al., 1996; White, 2002).  
The products of potential suppliers and the buying behaviour of potential buyers 
exist independently of a firm’s plans.  In contrast, the formulation of the plans is a 
subjective and imaginative process undertaken within firms, such that any “unified” 
external resources may be combined in different ways with respect to different firms’ 
subjective plans and planning processes.  In the first instance, learning by doing and more 
generally autonomous routinization of emerging and designed planning, implementing, 
reviewing procedures creates resources over time within the specific location of a firm in 
activities undertaken from direct and indirect capabilities.
 10
  In this sense, the firm is not 
so much a general autopoietic system, but more specifically one that both exhibits and 
creates redundancy (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001).  In a second sense, although the 
created resources are free in that they jointly produced and reproduced alongside a plan 
of activities, they are awaiting connection with a new or amended plan of productive 
activities before they can be assimilated and adapted as resources yielding productive 
services.  One set (and possibly type) of resources’ productive services is required in 
order to acquire and connect another set (Scarborough, 1998). 
Penrose (1995) describes these processes of generating and also capturing 
resources within firms as “economies of growth,” and they are only available to firms that 
have undertaken a general commitment commensurate with being enterprising.  Firms 
that make a general commitment to being enterprising do so irreversibly as they employ 
personnel, especially in management teams, to actively and deliberately “know more than 
they can do at any one moment in time” or with respect to a current plan or combination 
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of plans (Brusoni et al., 2001; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001).  While Penrose does not use 
these terms, the categories of direct and indirect capabilities are again useful here.  
Steindl’s firms, by assumption or empirical proposition, only invest in their own 
industries (Steindl, 1976, p. 41).  Penrose’s firms are likely to re-invest in themselves and 
their current activities (there is no industry group) by virtue of accumulated experience 
among those involved in reproducing both direct and indirect capabilities.  A proportion 
of capacity formed through processes of feedback remains as firm-specific capacity, 
rather than being translated into what are initially insider finances or earnings.  Penrose’s 
firms retain the possibility of diversification, alongside the process of industry 
consolidation foreseen in Steindl’s analysis.   
The subset of progressive or enterprising firms, as identified by their planned 
commitments to expanding their capacities and irrespective of whether considered within 
firm-centric or industry-centric frameworks, expand in order to create additional value.  
Changes in value are defined simply as changes in economic rent, and this may 
subsequently be shared or dissipated across and within the firms and other organizations 
connected into the range of productive activities, understood from the perspective of a 
focal firm and/or industry.  In Steindl’s (1976, pp. 46-50) argument, the prime 
entrepreneurial act is developing a firm’s ability to supply existing products given the 
alternative actions of altering the firm’s capital intensity or gearing ratio.  In Penrose’s 
argument, the entrepreneurial act is pervasive in seeking novel combinations for the 
firm’s established and created resources, together with bought-in resources and market 
opportunities.
11
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The source of a firm’s value in expanding capacity for Steindl is in achieving 
operating costs that are below the average of the industry, allowing a progressive firm to 
take over the market share of a rival with higher than average operating costs.  Expansion 
is realised through offering a standardized or commodity product at a lower price and/or 
increasing selling and marketing activities among actual and potential buyers in 
downstream markets.  This is notwithstanding some spillover effects of progressive 
firms’ marketing that may benefit the whole industry by expanding demand generally.   
If expansion is to be considered as an entrepreneurial act, then by extension – and in 
Knightian terms – the reactions of higher and also lower-cost rivals within the focal 
industry group are sources of uncertainty, as are the reactions of actual and potential 
buyers (Knight, 1921; White, 2002).  By comparison the acts of buying additional fixed 
capital, financed by acquiring a combination of insider and external finance are not in 
themselves sources of irreducible uncertainty, given the planned expansion.   
We can refer to Menger (1976, pp. 52-6) for a general account of how resources 
may acquire economic value through being connected to a stream of activities leading 
ultimately to final consumption.  Expanding the means of economic organization can 
include the indirect satisfaction of wants through means of roundabout production, 
encouraging and encompassing levels of activities that are successively of higher order 
and so more distant from final consumption.  While Menger identifies firms and 
households as units of analysis, so also as black boxes, he also identifies a process of 
commodification through and supported by markets (Hong, 2000).  Menger identifies a 
process by which a set of “useful things” may successively be converted into “economic 
goods” by means of connection with what we could now call “value chains”.  In static 
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terms and despite the emphasis on processes in Menger’s argument, the distinction 
between economic goods and other useful things is easy to draw.  Something has 
economic value if it is connected with a plan of activities, itself culminating in an act of 
final consumption, and in so being also exhibits properties of commodity and 
marketability.  The problem is in the proximity of as yet unconnected things, where we 
can anticipate that something could feasibly be connected, so acquiring the status of 
economic good. 
In Penrose’s theory, economies of growth are available through individuals in 
firms enacting capabilities to connect what we might call proto-resources or anticipated 
resources with plans, thereby first imagining and then implementing the retrieval of 
productive services from resources.  The act of planning is the entrepreneurial act of 
envisaging that resources can feasibly acquire economic value.  Penrose’s firms exhibit 
Knightian uncertainty in the act of planning and connecting resources with this plan, 
which is located within firms and to some degree among the activities drawn from 
indirect capabilities. 
From a behavioural perspective, it is the accumulation of capacity perceived to be 
surplus or under-utilized capacity that lowers the average value of the expanding firm’s 
capacity, which leads firms to embark upon lowering prices and greater selling efforts.  
This assumes that companies have their main focus of attention in downstream markets, 
populated by actual and potential buyers (White, 2002).  It could be the case that firms 
have a greater focus of attention in the connections upstream of their main activities.  In 
which case, additional efforts are required in sourcing additional projects, lowering 
“hurdle rates” below that which are customary for the industry on average for accepting 
19 
new projects, and in industrial or business-to-business marketing efforts.  Higher-cost 
firms then become starved of new productive activities and projects to which their 
capacities may otherwise be employed.   
Given Steindl’s industry-centric form of analysis, firms are agents in creating 
additional capacity within their own boundaries, and destroying the industry capacity that 
is located within the boundaries of higher-cost firms. There need not be Schumpeterian 
innovation involved in this process of destroying the value of capacity through 
disconnecting it from chains of activities, but there may well be incremental Marshallian 
innovation in the industry relating directly to products.  When an innovation is available 
to all as embodied in fixed capital goods, such as with Salter’s (1960) vintage-capital 
model, it is an external economy, conditional upon all firms first acquiring capacity in the 
forms of internal and external finance. The characterization of the source of technical 
change in Steindl’s analysis and its implications for the dynamics of competition, and 
hence the creation and destruction of value, are discussed in Bloch (2005).  
So much for extending capacity and evaluating its growth as a process.  We know 
from Steindl, Schumpeter and from contemporary contributors to the dynamic 
capabilities approach – including Henderson and Clark (1990) and Flaherty (2000), 
though not explicitly in Penrose (1995) – that capacity can be destroyed because its value 
is reduced.  In effect, resources are disconnected from a value-chain.  As part of this 
process, capacity may be utilized at rates that are lower than customary or as envisaged 
during processes of corporate review and planning.  Variations in (under-)utilization can 
be assessed over business cycles in the macroeconomic assessments of capacity (Driver 
20 
and Shepherd, 2005).  In micro and meso terms, the “un-valuing” of capacity is perhaps 
traced more effectively through the changing connections of a focal firm’s activities. 
If a product or a production system is decomposable, the principles of modularity, 
of architecture, interfaces and standards (Langlois, 2002, p. 23), may be threatened, 
disconnecting the way in which resources yield productive services with respect to a plan.  
Disconnected resources as direct capabilities are themselves at risk of devaluation if the 
principles of connection are accidentally destroyed or re-arranged.  Capacity that is 
under-utilized may be so because, strictly, it has ceased to become capacity and has 
reverted to – in Menger’s terms – “other useful things.”   
 
 
5.  Bottlenecks: A broadly evolutionary approach to empirical analysis 
Steindl (1976, p. 14) argues that, ‘In order to establish the capacity of a plant we have in 
practice to confine our attention to one particular piece of equipment which forms a 
decisive bottleneck and  … occupies a strategic position in the plant ….’  For Steindl, this 
is a pragmatic, empirical and almost throw-away remark.
12
  It is an admission that the 
underlying process is complex, but can only be captured partially and by an empirical 
proxy (Thompson, 1967).  Steindl’s advice conforms with his view of industries 
comprising firms, the heterogeneity of which is determined by differential access to 
imperfect ‘outsider’ capital markets, rather than any significant differential access to 
types of capital goods.  We can propose that the bottleneck is a stable means of 
comparison across firms in particular industries for specified time periods given 
imperfect competition, providing a means of comparing capital intensity and capital 
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utilization.  With the benefit of historical records, we can capture “normal” capacity 
usage, variation over time for individual firms, and make cross-sectional comparisons.   
 In this section, we seek to develop the idea of bottleneck from Steindl’s pragmatic 
concerns, with the bottleneck as the flipside of surplus capacity (Langlois, 1992; Langlois 
and Robertson, 1995, p. 24).  In so doing, we investigate whether the concept of 
bottleneck is more general than process manufacturing, possibly extending to the 
subjective activities related to indirect capabilities of firms that Penrose envisages.   
 
5.1 Bottlenecks among fixed capital and in other productive services 
Bottlenecks may be understood as both wasteful, as a problem with clear symptoms that 
are to be resolved, and as a feature of an established operating system.  For a bottleneck 
to signify waste within a firm, a member of that firm must be capable of undertaking 
search to discover it and to formulate means of its resolution.  Someone needs to imagine 
how things could be different, that is to perceive that there is some as yet unused 
(potential) capacity that can be captured.  This is the essence of Rosenberg’s (1976, p. 
125) observation, and also of the case study analyses presented by Nightingale et al. 
(2003).  While Rosenberg writes of novel solutions and innovative activities, Nightingale 
et al. undertake an analysis of gaining access to unused capacity in large technical 
systems through installing ‘a class of capital goods called control systems’ (Nightingale 
2003, p. 478).  Langlois (1992) and Langlois and Robertson (1995) take a more 
conceptual approach and point out that a bottleneck also implies an anti-bottleneck (un-
used capacity), which can be accessed by “spinning-out” and so reorganizing different 
production activities into separate firms.   
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 Resolving waste associated with bottlenecks tends to involve grappling with the 
consequences of indivisibilities in fixed capital, coordinating fixed capital with varying 
degrees of indivisibility, and also responding to fluctuating and perhaps irreducibly 
uncertain demand.  Resolution also implies a transition.  The bottleneck begins as a 
normal and potentially undetected feature of a firm’s established capacity and as a 
consequence of adapting capacity to an expected level of demand.  The bottleneck’s 
identification involves the recognition of there being some surplus, unutilized or even 
unconnected capacity.   Finally, we can anticipate an articulation and instigation of some 
plan to identify and resolve the bottleneck through technical or organizational means.   
Capturing or releasing any additional capacity requires additional problem-
solving activities drawn from indirect capabilities, requiring additional investment in 
capacity, and some organizational innovation, so changes a state.  This is more 
problematic to capture and measure in Penrose’s case than in Steindl’s case.  For Steindl, 
the additional capacity is “more of the same”.  One (progressive) company’s capture of 
its surplus capacity is leads to the accidental or deliberate creative destruction among 
other (marginal) firms in the industry.  For Penrose, any potential capacity that is 
unavailable due to bottlenecks remains as unconnected resources, and cannot become 
productive services until some additional change is made to the firm’s operations.   
Bottlenecks could be crucial factors in theoretical accounts of imperfect 
competition that occur partly through capacity fluctuations in all of micro, meso and 
macro levels of analysis.  They can also be comparable metering points among firms by 
virtue of firms being in a common industry, once it has also been established that a group 
of firms are connected through competitive relations by selling in the same market.  The 
23 
identification of bottlenecks requires in-depth case-study research, as would the further 
identification of groups of firms involved in competitive relationships in the same market.   
Steindl’s interest in bottlenecks is in measurement, in the context of capacity 
being identified with fixed capital and, implicitly, in manufacturing activities.  In 
evolutionary terms, our interest extends to considering how bottlenecks are perceived and 
resolved within firms and also among firms at the level of an industry.  As argued above, 
this leads us into considering variations in tacit and embedded procedures and shared or 
comparable routines of practice among firms as indirect capabilities alongside variations 
in fixed capital.  This practical research task potentially provides us with a measure, 
however difficult to articulate, codify, categorise and compare, which is capable of 
supporting broad principles of evolution.   
Rather than capture heterogeneity along a single index – in bimodal terms as the 
categories of “marginal” and “progressive” – we can arrange observations around 
dimensions of a bottleneck defined in the context of a group of competing companies.  
We can then analyse companies using some evolutionary principles, we hold out the 
potential of organizing observations again around the notion of how companies perceive, 
manage and address bottlenecks.  The bottleneck anchors the firm over a period of time, 
being in part a constraint and in part a means of stability. 
 
5.2 Codifying variety and variation  
It is a straightforward matter to observe variation across firms in a group at a point in 
time, irrespective of whether the group is defined tightly as an industry, or less formally 
as a network of firms with overlapping capabilities and markets once some common 
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reference point has been established.  It is also straightforward to attribute this variation 
in general terms to idiosyncratic paths of development among corporate bodies and 
among personnel.  It is more difficult to provide a simple explanation of the processes 
that affect variation and to capture these in sufficient dimensions so as to enable 
comparison without compromising the inherent complexity.  Social scientists have tended 
to draw upon Lamarckian approaches, in which agents can seek to alter their behavioural 
tendencies through deliberative selection.   
 Deliberative and necessarily imperfect imitation is hence a significant source of 
variation, and one that is appropriate to our analysis of the consequences of capacity 
growth.  Imitation is necessarily imperfect because the imitator has to unravel some 
observed practice from another context and then adapt this imitation to her own context 
(which might be simply a matter of having higher unit costs).  If routines within firms are 
to be analogues of a genotype, there is probably ‘too much variation’ (Andersen, 1994).  
Routines are continually, but inaccurately reproduced in action, which is imperfectly and 
irregularly subject to conscious review and selection within companies and competitive 
and (perhaps) near-autonomous selection between firms in industry-market settings.
 13
   
We need a way of capturing significant variation as implied by Steindl, but lost in 
his simple codification strategy of adopting an ordinal scale, and as set out only in a firm-
specific manner by Penrose.  Bottlenecks are a site of variety and variation, which in 
principle can be measured, related to direct and indirect capabilities, and also adopted as 
part of a broadly evolutionary explanation of the interactions between firms and 
industries.  
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Steindl has a clear selection process through his ‘ideal’ pattern of competition.  
Penrose has no explicit general means of selection across firms because her firms are 
idiosyncratic and, if successful, are so presumably because they develop niches, 
comparable with Chamberlinian “mini-monopolies”.  Steindl’s model is an example of 
survivor selection (Knudsen, 2002).  This is mainly because areas of variation, for 
example in adopting and absorbing new capital equipment (available only to a subset of 
firms in an industry), and in undertaking successful marketing and selling efforts, are 
reduced in his model to budgetary choices.  Further, and implicitly, these are connected to 
spending proportions of accumulated capital (or “insider” money), depending on the 
overall state of capacity in the industry in response to an overall and exogenous level of 
demand.  Simply, the tendency is for companies with lower cost to be selected, given an 
ordered, unequal but unproblematic access to innovative fixed capital.  This is activated 
once the growth in accumulation among some, or all, progressive firms exceeds that of 
market demand, leading to surplus capacity among these firms and at the level of the 
industry. 
In straying beyond Steindl’s model and including accounts of selection and 
retention too, we would need to know something of two or more firm-level behavioural 
strategies, such as “be a progressive firm” or “be a marginal firm”.  Following Steindl, 
there is no scope for a Lamarckian interpretation because the scope for entrepreneurs or 
managers choosing among these phenotypes is strictly one off.  Further, the choice is 
really determined by the availability and scale of both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ financial 




In attempting to present Penrose’s argument in terms of broadly evolutionary 
principles of selection, we are confronted with a complex series of idiosyncratic 
processes, combining instances of autonomous and deliberative selection, which may be 
simultaneous.  These are also nested or loosely hierarchical, as with the co-presence of 
dynamic or indirect capabilities and direct capabilities.  The success of a firm depends 
partly on the resources available to it at any moment, either in-house or close-at-hand, 
and the capabilities in firms of capturing these resources.  These accumulate from past 
performance and past selection, but without some stability through retention, this is 
difficult to compare and generalize across firms.  Managers also draw upon imagination, 
improvisation and accumulated knowledge to make judgments as to how to translate 
some resources into productive services, and also to combine these productive services in 
alignment with some perceived (and uniquely perceivable) market opportunity.   
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In the introduction to the 1976 edition of Maturity and Stagnation in American 
Capitalism, Steindl reflects on developments in the period since the original publication 
in 1952. He notes that the period since 1952 could be characterized by robust growth, 
rather than the stagnation he suggests might be expected with the maturity of many 
American manufacturing industries. He also suggests that his ideas have changed 
somewhat in two respects that are relevant to our discussion above. First, he notes the 
expansion of forms of competition by oligoplistic firms, including sales outlays, product 
innovation and direct investments abroad. Second, he at least partially recants on his 
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denial of the role of exhaustion of a long technological wave in explaining the decline in 
American capitalism in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Our discussion suggests Steindl’s definition of capacity is too narrow to deal with 
the evolving nature of modern capitalism. We expand the concept of capacity by noting 
that bottlenecks which constrain the expansion of the activities of firms might occur in a 
number of different forms, not limited to inadequate plant or capital equipment.  We 
point to the work of Penrose in The Theory of the Growth of Firms as providing a higher-
order concept of capacity in the form of managerial capability, but suggest even this 
broader concept is artificially restricted in terms of allowing for the role of imagination 
and enterprise is overcoming bottlenecks. Instead, we argue for an evolutionary and 
empirical approach to the study of capacity. 
Further, we argue that it is inadequate to consider capacity only at the level of the 
firm. Instead, we adopt a micro-meso-macro approach. The expansion of capacity by an 
individual firm (micro level) impacts on competition in the industry (meso level). This, in 
turn, affects the environment in which firms make investment decisions in plant and 
equipment, research and development, marketing and managerial resources, which add up 
to determining the course of demand and supply growth for the aggregate economy 
(macro level). We follow Steindl in suggesting the industry (meso level), particularly the 
pattern of competition in the industry, is the critical link in understanding evolution of 
capitalism as a whole. What is required is the working out of the pattern of competition 
using the broader set of forms of competition that Steindl identifies and allowing for the 
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2. We use the phrase “industry systems” in preference to “industries” in order to 
emphasize even in abstract terms the discrete and also ongoing nature of the industry as 
our meso unit of analysis.  The problem of drawing boundaries undermines many 
readers’ appreciation of Chamberlin’s (1933) exposition of imperfect competition 
 
3. Penrose’s approach lends itself to case studies in which individual companies form the 
focus of inquiry, as in her studies of the Hercules Power Company and of Holden Motors 
(Penrose, 1956, 1960; Kay, 1999).  
 
4. Loasby (1999A) also argues that the firm can be seen as a system of options.  Chandler 
(1962) makes a comparable argument, with firms being useful institutional forms for 
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generating and then using up fixed capital assets, which are risky to hold for long periods 
prior to pay back. 
 
5. Bowles and Gintis (1993) describe these borrow-lender exchanges as contestable 
exchanges.  In conditions of asymmetry and uncertainty, exchanges within the institution 
of markets can be closed by additional means, such as lenders dividing potential 
borrowers into short- and long-sider structures.   
 
6. Steindl sets out a table with supporting data showing the differences in the cost of 
floating securities and another showing the cost of borrowing for loans (short-term credit) 
decreases with the size of the loan. 
 
7. Following Winter (2003), repeatability is an essential feature of indirect or dynamic 
capabilities.  Repetition itself implies that indirect or dynamic capabilities can be shared, 
so are not characterized by personal and subjective knowledge, and have the character of 
large-grained corporate routines 
 
8. Following Winter (2003) and Moorman and Miner (1998), improvisation is much more 
a matter of personal knowledge and is difficult to attribute to a firm’s dynamic, indirect 
or even higher-order  capabilities as significant features of a firm’s capabilities are 
repeatability and being shared.   
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9. And by implication, sellers of capital goods face simple – as opposed to complex – 
tasks in selling their products to firms in the focal industry, in contrast to the functional 
requirement of short and long-sider relationships in markets governing exchanges of 
external finance. 
 
10. We do not mean to imply any primacy of a higher-order corporate activity, or any 
particular ordering.  These activities may be undertaken in different connections and 
intensities.  The Penrosian point is that routinization releases resources, and these can 
potentially yield further productive services given additional plans and patterns of 
connection. 
 
11. Penrose (1952, p. 809) argues for caution in the application of biological analogies: 
‘It can be admitted that to some extent firms operate automatically in accordance with 
principles governing the mechanism constructed, but to abandon their development to the 
laws of nature diverts attention from the importance of human decisions and motives, and 
from problems of ethics and public policy, and surrounds the whole question of the 
growth of the firm with an aura of “naturalness” and even “inevitability.”’  There is no 
inevitability as growth depends on the connection of resources in the form of productive 
services to entrepreneurial visions.  The “limited extent of automatic operation” implies 
at least two levels of capabilities, aside from a firm’s capacity to generate and capture 
new resources and entrepreneurial visions. 
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12. This is of interest for two reasons.  First, it allows us to think of capacity within a 
plant, establishment or firm to do with bottlenecks and anti-bottlenecks (Langlois and 
Robertson 1995).  Second, it allows us to expand our analysis to different types of 
production process following the industrial sociology tradition of Woodward (1965) and 
Thompson (1967).  Lanlgois (1992) advises that some bottlenecks are organizational in 
origin and can be ameliorated by spinning-off stages of production and redrawing 
corporate boundaries.   
 
13. There is no necessity in characterizing external relations with customers and rival 
producers in markets as autonomous selection.  There is a good deal of deliberation, 
especially in business-to-business relationships, although a cluster of connected firms 
may be jointly selected by processes better characterized as near autonomous (Loasby, 
2002).  Downie (1958) introduces the notion of an “innovation mechanism” as a means 
for firms to modify routines that are relatively inefficient. 
 
14. A set up of two phenotypes or strategies is consistent with an analysis drawing upon 
the technique of evolutionary game theory (Gintis, 2000).  In this context, it is worth 
thinking about the advantages of being a “marginal firm” relative to being a “progressive 
firm.”  It may be in terms of entrepreneurs wanting to use up old fixed capital, or being 
risk averse and not wanting to sink “insider” finance. 
